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Abstract: 
Conceptualizations of mental health and mental illness continue to be an important influence in 
shaping social work practice and education. By critically analyzing the emergence of the current 
concepts of “brain disease” and “behavioral health,” we are able to better understand the 
stakeholders in this renaming process. The inherent assumptions and the sociopolitical aspects of 
these two concepts are analyzed. Recommendations for social work practitioners and educators 
in preparing for a future in which they will participate more fully in the professional dialog about 
changes in the vocabulary of mental illness and thus more meaningfully shape the service 
delivery system in general, and the social work domain, in particular, are offered. 
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Article: 
Social worker and well-known critic of the concept of “mental disorder,” Jerome Wakefield 
(1992, 1993) called for renewed discussion and critical analysis of the changing concepts we use 
in mental health practice. Kutchins and Kirk (1997), Caplan (1995), Chamberlin (1998) and 
Valenstein (1998) have also significantly contributed to the ongoing dialog about the meaning of 
language and labels in mental health and psychiatry. Such analyses are important because 
throughout history, shifts in the field’s lexicon and the concomitant conceptualizations of mental 
health and mental illness, have had significant impact on the nature and structure of mental 
health service delivery. Given our own professional prominence in that field (O’Neill, 1999), 
these ideas are a major influence on social work practice and education. 
This paper offers a critical analysis of the concepts of “brain disease” and “behavioral health” in 
particular, both important contemporary exemplars of this conceptual evolution. Our analytical 
template consists of two dimensions. First, we will examine the inherent assumptions of each 
term, or the implications for etiology, personal responsibility, and self-determination, which 
seem to underlie or be associated with each concept. Second, we will examine what we are 
calling sociopolitical aspects of both “brain disease” and “behavioral health.” Here we will 
address who “wins” and who “loses” in the rivalry among providers for control or dominance in 
the mental health field and what are the implications for families and consumers as important 
stakeholders in these conceptualizations. Both dimensions of analysis provide insight into how 
the use of these concepts helps to define specifically who should deliver services, who should 
receive them, what those services should look like, and where and under what conditions they 
should be delivered. Finally, we offer some recommendations for social work practitioners and 
educators in preparing for the future in which they will participate more fully in the professional 
dialog about changes in the vocabulary of mental illness and thus more meaningfully shape the 
service delivery system in general, and the social work domain in particular. 
This paper has grown out of a desire to stimulate social workers’ criticism of emergent 
conceptualizations with an eye toward the implications for their practice and professional 
development. It is not our desire to draw final conclusions about the merit or utility of “brain 
disease” and “behavioral health.” Both can be seen as less problematic than older concepts of 
mental illness as “possession” or as a result of “schizophrenogenic mothering.” However, it is 
our premise that the meanings, assumptions and ideas that underlie the professional lexicon 
should be more fully and openly excavated, explored, and debated. 
ANALYSIS OF BRAIN DISEASE AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 
Brain Disease 
In psychiatric circles and increasingly in the public eye, it seems a foregone conclusion that most 
of themental disorders thought of as “mental illnesses” are related to abnormalities or 
dysfunction in the brain, such as dysregulation of neurotransmitters, the presence of large frontal 
lobes, lack of integrating functions in the central nervous system, or decreased blood flow or 
metabolism in certain regions of the brain. The list of disorders thought to be connected to such 
brain abnormalities seems to grow every day. While there is still lively debate, these include at 
the very least, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, clinical depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, and panic disorder. This emergence of “brain disease” to describe the most serious 
mental illnesses represents the convergence of several interrelated factors, including both 
planned and serendipitous discoveries about the efficacy of psychotropic medications. 
Additionally, it is likely also related to significant increases in resources for brain research and 
especially the improvement in technological sophistication for brain imaging. Research using 
such tools has uncovered much about brain chemistry, structure, and function and its relationship 
to behavioral functioning. Also essential to understanding the conceptualization of mental illness 
as “brain disease” is the disillusionment with theories of etiology that emphasized family 
interaction. These theories often assumed an otherwise normal child was somehow made to go 
“crazy” as a result of parental bungling. The full rejection of the older “family blaming” theories 
of the etiology of serious mental illness in favor of neurobiological explanations is certainly 
within sight. Questions still remain about ultimate causes (genetic, viral, environmental, 
physiological) of the biological correlates of mental illness. 
Inherent Assumptions. Thinking of mental illness as “brain disease” seems to fit squarely in what 
has been called the “medical model.” This model is often understood to mean that dysfunction, 
with whatever manifestation, is related to some physiological problem which can be accurately 
diagnosed by an expert who examines the “patient” objectively, and can then in turn prescribe 
some curative or restorative remedy, typically a medication. The medical model of treatment, 
despite having made tremendous contributions in the study and treatment of mental illness, has 
been criticized by proponents of the strengths perspective and empowerment approaches to 
practice (e.g., Rapp, 1998; Saleeby, 1996) because it traditionally relies on the assumption of a 
relatively passive patient who yields to the authority of a professional provider/physician in 
complying with whatever treatment is prescribed to treat the symptoms of the disorder. 
Interestingly, mental illness as “brain disease” is reminiscent, theoretically, of the early 
definitions of schizophrenia as “dementia praecox,” where mentally ill people were also seen as 
suffering from a disease of the brain (Kaplan & Sadock, 1998). In these cases, psychosis was 
seen as having been caused by some known (like syphilis) or unknown virus or infection. An 
important difference between today’s conceptualization of mental illness as “brain disease,” and 
similar ones a hundred years ago, is around the notion of hope. In the dementia praecox days, 
mental illness as “brain disease” was associated with despair and professional impotence–a 
feeling that “there’s nothing we can do.” Indeed, part of the massive appeal of Freud’s 
psychosexual theories of etiology were related to inherent promises that disorders of the “mind” 
could be treated with psychological means. If one simply got enough analysis of the right kind, 
one could get better. In stark contrast, it is now the conceptualizations of mental illness as “brain 
disease” that seem to be associated with tremendous hope, this time for an eventual medical cure 
of mental illness. It seems the more “biological” a disorder is now thought to be, the more 
treatable it is seen to be, and thus the greater hope there is for a positive course or outcome, 
presuming the “patient” is “compliant” with treatment. On the other hand, severe emotional 
difficulties and personality disorders, still largely thought to be primarily psychological in origin, 
seem now to be associated with bleaker prognoses and poorer treatment success than biological 
disorders such as bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, or Tourette’s Syndrome, all 
thought to be treated effectively with medication. 
While self-determination and free will are complex issues and should not be oversimplified into 
polarities, it is our position that the conceptualizations of mental illness as “brain disease” and 
“behavioral health” do impact notions of personal responsibility that are interesting to explore. 
For example, mental illness as a “brain disease” does not require the person experiencing its 
manifestation to feel personally responsible for the actual presence of the problem, even if they 
may still be responsible for aspects of their recovery. An event or events outside the person’s 
conscious control and admittedly not fully understood has occurred due to chance or genetics, in 
much the same way pancreatic cancer, heart disease or multiple sclerosis strikes. Additionally, 
mental illness as “brain disease” does not require the person’s family to take any blame for the 
illness of their offspring, except for the culpability of passing on a genetic predisposition. Thus, 
the increased acknowledgement of mental illness as brain disease may be due in part to the 
strong appeal this conceptualization has for families and consumers, especially when contrasted 
with older theories.  
A darker aspect of the “brain disease” conceptualization is seen through this very notion of 
consumers not being able to “help” having a disease being equated with an inability to have 
insight into their current symptoms or circumstances. The model has been used to call into 
question a consumer’s capacity, through no fault of his or her own, to make decisions or govern 
his or her own actions, especially if “noncompliant” with medical treatment (Torrey, 1997). This 
aspect of mental illness as “brain disease” is especially complicated for social work, with its 
emphasis on self-determination. An important dialog among social workers about the 
intersection between self-determination and disease models has already begun and passions are 
high on both sides. Many speak out for the consumer’s right to refuse treatment unless the 
consumer is adjudicated incompetent and even then for substitute decision-makers to honor prior 
choices when possible (Bentley, 1993; Chamberlin, 1998). The emphasis is on the consumer’s 
basic human dignity and right to make decisions even if their decisions are symptomatic of 
mental illness. Others invoke beneficence, or acting for the good of an impaired consumer 
(Murdach, 1996; Rosenson, 1993), arguing essentially that “coercive treatment is better than 
benign neglect” (Valiant, 1997, p. 286). Often included in the beneficence camp are family 
members and advocates who specifically argue that because mental illness is a brain disease it 
must therefore affect mental and cognitive functions such as judgment and recall, and therefore, 
a consumer’s rights should be tempered with paternalism (Rosenson, 1993; Torrey, 1997). It may 
be that this equation of “brain disease,” with lack of insight and capacity, added to the increasing 
public fear of nonmedicated consumers, has led to the expansion of laws to mandate outpatient 
treatment (e.g., Kendra’s Law in New York) and to liberalize commitment standards to include 
the “gravely disabled” in addition to those who are an imminent danger to self or others (Bentley 
& Taylor, 2002, b). 
Sociopolitical Issues. Analyzing stakeholders in the conceptualization of mental illness as brain 
disease essentially asks the question “Who wins and who loses?” Or, in other words, whose 
social, economic, and political interests are best served by the adoption of the current 
conceptualization. While stakeholder analysis has largely emerged from the management 
literature (Elias, Cavana, & Jackson, 2002; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), the 
concept of stakeholder can be applied to many areas. For our purposes, “stakeholder” is defined 
borrowing from Freeman (1984) and Mitchell et al. (1997) as who or what really counts. In this 
case, “who or what” relates to the forces that are both forming the concept of “brain disease” (the 
medical profession, pharmaceutical companies, research-endowing entities), and those affected 
by the concept (families, consumers, managed care, etc.). Our stakeholder analysis is offered as 
an exploration, and is not intended as an indictment of “winners” in the “brain disease” 
conceptualization.  
While very different writers and ideological opposites, the work of both Thomas Szasz (1987, 
1994) and E. Fuller Torrey (1988, 1997) offer useful polar perspectives on the sociopolitical 
implications of mental illness as “brain disease.” For example, Torrey describes brain diseases as 
essentially neurological diseases and so he suggests they move into the care arena of 
neurologists, in much the same way as Parkinson’s Disease has done. Torrey supports this 
transition with several arguments. First, he argues that conceptualizing severemental illness as 
brain disease–and not as a behavioral health issue or emotional disorder–is a way of ensuring 
that these consumers will receive the comprehensive medical treatment they deserve, including 
intensive psychopharmacological and community-based treatments. Torrey also argues that 
serious mental illnesses are completely different from various types of emotional distress or 
reactions to trauma and loss, and services should be structured and delivered as such. People 
suffering from stress in life transitions and accidents, once characterized pejoratively as “the 
worried well,” should be helped in the social service system and not contribute to the exploding 
demand for true mental illness insurance coverage. In Torrey’s world, if everyone is considered 
mentally ill then no one is mentally ill (1997), that is, the concept becomes so watered down it is 
rendered meaningless. 
If Torrey’s argument is accepted, it is clear that physicians (MDs), pharmaceutical companies, 
and the medical establishment benefit in the conceptualization of mental illness as “brain 
disease” in terms of establishment of domain. Social workers in so far as they are employed by 
hospitals or in conjunction with medical practices would also be beneficiaries. Social and 
economic benefits follow from these benefits such as increased stature, increased scope of 
practice, and increased research funding. Physicians are seen as the necessary and logical choice 
for leadership roles in the management of “brain diseases” and “allied” professionals such as 
psychologists, licensed counselors, and social workers play a smaller or supporting role in the 
treatment of brain diseases, perhaps even performing only under the direct supervision of a 
physician.  
Families can also be cast as beneficiaries of a brain disease conceptualization of mental illness, 
as we have implied. Not surprisingly, “blaming the brain” as Valenstein (1998) calls it, is a 
conceptualization of mental illness that families have embraced because of its stark contrast to 
“blaming the family” and its virtual elimination of the idea of familial causation beyond genetics. 
The resulting relief of unnecessary, malignant guilt and remorse for families may be one of the 
most beneficial implications in the conceptualization of mental illness as brain disease. It may 
also explain why it has been so staunchly defended by members of family advocacy groups and 
mental health organizations such as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) who 
describe severe mental illness as “known to be treatable brain disorders” (www.nami.org/history, 
2003). In fact, a recent on-line survey conducted by NAMI (N= 358) found a sizable majority 
(91.34%) endorsing the statement that “genes or inheritance play a role in the development of 
severe mental disorders” (www.nami.org, 2003). 
Thomas Szasz (1994), well known for his scathing critiques of the psychiatric establishment, has 
long tried to expose what he sees as simply physicians’ self-interest, which he believes is 
reflected in the movement toward medicalizing mental health problems. He takes the position 
that an increasingly medical understanding of “mental illness” functions primarily as a 
justification for the future of a lucrative, dominating profession. Likewise, Valenstein (1998) 
points out that, while it is more palatable to go from “blaming mother to blaming the brain” (p. 
1), there are premature assumptions of the neurobiological etiology of mental illness that are still 
unproven. He specifically states that the early research findings into the beneficial effects of 
psychotropic medications have been exaggerated, and that too many negative findings go 
unreported. He notes that discussions of the “biological etiology” of mental illness reflect an 
assumption of unidirectionality of causation, that is that physical changes in the brain lead to 
symptoms of mental illness, period. Medical researchers too often ignore the reality that 
psychosocial and environmental events can cause changes in the brain and thus may play a role 
in etiology. David Cohen (1988, 1997) offered similar arguments in social work, which have 
been in turn strongly attacked by Johnson (1989). Bentley and Walsh (2001) have taken what 
might be called the middle road position: Because one affirms a biological model of mental 
illness does not mean one must turn a blind eye to the reality of the medical profession’s drive 
for dominance in treating mental illness and its relationship to the economic aspects of 
prescription writing, drug-research budgets, and insurance reimbursement regulations.  
To the list of winners in the brain disease conceptualization of mental illness, we add many 
mental health consumers. Many consumers may feel freed by the idea of brain disease as it 
relieves societal pressure for them to somehow cure themselves by simply adopting a new 
“attitude” (or cognition) or by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps through sheer will. Also 
removed is the implication that they somehow contributed to having the disease through poor life 
skills or an inability to cope with reality. Also a “brain disease” conceptualization might help to 
yield such benefits as a stronger mandate for life-long comprehensive health or mental health 
services. In the absence of a “medical cure,” as with cancer, heart disease and AIDS, there may 
be a growing recognition that “medical management” should entail supportive psychosocial 
supports and community-based services. It should be noted, however, that in a recent on-line 
survey conducted by NAMI a “significant minority” of respondents reported fearing advances in 
mental illness genetics research because of the fact that it could lead to discrimination against 
people with these disorders (www.nami.org, 2003).  
Conspicuously absent from the list of winners in the emergence of “brain disease,” then, is the 
managed care industry. Because of their emphasis on short-term care, the need for treatment and 
supports over the entire life span might be a threat to economic solvency. Indeed, so far the 
industry has largely resisted demands to cover “biologically based” mental illnesses on an equal 
footing with medical diseases for fear of exploding budgets. Family and consumer advocates, on 
the other hand, are pushing hard for insurance “parity.” The managed care industry as 
stakeholder has a very different outlook in the analysis of “behavioral health” that follows. 
Behavioral Health 
Another shift in the lexicon of mental health and mental illness is in the growing use of the term 
“behavioral health.” “Behavioral health” was and is defined as the coalescence of medicine and 
psychology. While this definition seems to be alive and well in the social and behavioral 
sciences, the term also seems to have been coopted in recent years, by those in the specialty 
mental health sector and mental health related managed care companies. It is now frequently 
used as a shorthand term referring to the overarching topics of mental health and substance abuse 
services. Agencies, even those connected with hospitals, have changed their names from “mental 
health center” or “psychiatric unit” to “behavioral health services.” Obviously, the term 
behavioral health is attractive to agencies and professionals, however, the germane question to 
this analysis is why? What does “behavioral health” mean? Is it, as skeptics assert, just a new 
term for brain disease? Or, does it, as supporters argue, represent an inclusion of mind/body 
whole person awareness to a mostly medical specialty? 
In the current analysis, “behavioral health” is not intended as a polar perspective to “brain 
disease,” indeed, many would argue that the names are used interchangeably to describe a similar 
conceptualization. For example, it is common to see “behavioral health” described in the 
professional literature as simply the application of behavioral science knowledge to physical and 
emotional functioning in humans (e.g., Shueman, Troy, & Mayhugh, 1994; Luiselli, 1994; 
Freudenheim, 1996). However, an understanding of what “behavioral health” specifically refers 
to seems to have undergone some transition in the past two decades. Importantly, for our 
discussion, there appears to be a gap between how behavioral health was first envisioned, and 
what behavioral health in implementation appears to be. Our analysis of inherent assumptions 
underlying “behavioral health” is connected with the original or “ideal” view of what 
“behavioral health” means. By contrast, the analysis of stakeholders deals more with the actual 
implementation of “behavioral health” in practice today. 
Inherent Assumptions. Early definitions defined behavioral health as a subspecialty of behavioral 
medicine, and dealt mostly with issues of health maintenance and the prevention of illness in 
healthy people. Relevant topics included physical fitness, nutrition and weight control, smoking 
and drinking issues, accident prevention and stress management (Matarazzo, 1980). Today, the 
Journal of Behavioral Health publishes on such topics as cultural issues in breast self-exams, 
smoking and drinking in cancer patients, and pediatric headaches. However, “behavioral health” 
has come to encompass much more than these early examples represent. 
Behavioral health has from its inception been portrayed as a field that would serve to open up 
whole new opportunities for interdisciplinary research and practice (Luiselli, 1994). Its 
researchers and scholars promised to move away from a purely biomedical understanding of 
health and development to a more integrative biopsychosocial and holistic one. The developing 
behavioral health field originally held promise to finally acknowledge and even develop the 
mind-body connections and reciprocal influences. In sharp contrast to the medical model 
described earlier, Ford (1985, p. 93) said of the behavioral health movement: “it might be 
thought of as a modern expression of the old public health philosophy.” In other words, what 
people need to optimally function is knowledge and skills for healthy living in their everyday 
life. This suggests both public health screening and public education around lifestyle issues such 
as diet and exercise, self-monitoring, and accident prevention (Luiselli, 1994). 
Under the original definition of behavioral health, “mental” and “physical” health concerns of 
people are not seen as easily separated. “Behavioral health” issues are normalized in that most 
people are seen as dealing with them throughout the life span on a regular basis. Rather than 
objective diagnosis and treatment by an expert with a passive “patient,” the emphasis in the 
“mental health as behavioral health” model is collaborative education and prevention. The 
person being served must be an active and responsible participant in her or his rehabilitation and 
does this by embracing new knowledge and skills. The professional provider’s role is as a 
resource and a coach/trainer. Aspects of this model of behavioral health seem to be reflected in 
contemporary models of psychiatric rehabilitation and “partnership” practice (Bentley & Walsh, 
2001; Anthony, 1993; Corrigan, Liberman, & Engel, 1990). In these models, the emphasis is also 
on the consumer’s active role in his or her own “recovery.” Psychoeducation and skills training 
are often at the heart of these approaches. 
The shift in labeling to “behavioral health” may also relate to the convenience of a single term to 
capture the reality of the umbrella administrative structure of service delivery in many settings or 
organizations. Backlar (1996) argues that “behavioral health” is an appropriately inclusive and 
overarching term that can rightfully capture many disorders from addictions, serious mental 
illness, and developmental disabilities to less severe forms of emotional distress and stress 
management problems. This definition is most often associated with the managed behavioral 
health care industry, which includes everything from employee assistance programs to private 
health insurance companies to public mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse 
services. The change to “behavioral health” may also reflect a dissatisfaction with the term 
“mental health” which could be seen as too narrow, delimiting, or even as inaccurate. That is, 
“behavioral health” is more inclusive than simply “mental” functioning. 
Because “behavioral health” as it was initially conceptualized places such an emphasis on 
consumer-involved treatment, in the themes of self-determination and personal responsibility 
seem solidly present. In terms of etiology, problems with an individual’s behavioral health 
should, according to the original idealization of the concept, be seen as multi-causal and 
dynamic, concerning various aspects of the consumer’s life. All in all, there’s not much to dislike 
about the rise of “behavioral health” in theory. The problem occurs when analyzing the actual 
implementation of the concept. Could switching nomenclature to “behavioral health” represent a 
rhetorical change only, or perhaps a more palatable re-packaging of the medical model? 
Sociopolitical Issues. When analyzing stakeholders in a behavioral health conceptualization of 
mental health and mental illness, the contrast between behavioral health in theory and behavioral 
health in implementation is apparent. For example, while early definitions and implementation of 
behavioral health clearly benefited psychologists as a group, the argument could be made that in 
the mental health as “behavioral health” model, all providers across disciplines should “win” 
because differing perspectives on assessment are viewed as crucial and comprehensive services 
seem to be valued. Indeed, almost all of the early writings on behavioral health emphasize how 
conceptualizations of mental health as “behavioral health” suggest an interdisciplinary and 
holistic approach to care. Regrettably, however, social workers are rarely, if ever, mentioned in 
this literature, even though social workers are providing many behavioral health services. Even 
now, the authors who publish in these journals are usually not identified as social workers. 
“Behavioral health” seems to be pointing to increasing treatment approaches that are focused on 
quickly reducing symptoms and building concrete coping skills. In this way, managed behavioral 
health care companies are clear “winners,” as they have been credited with saving millions of 
dollars by depending heavily on short-term models of care delivered by nonphysician providers 
instead of open-ended insight oriented therapies (Findlay, 1999). Again, however, many skeptics 
note that, in reality, the behavioral health field ignores too many, especially those who don’t fit 
neatly into a short-term intervention model, like people with serious mental illness. In addition, 
for most employees with health insurance, their “mental health” services, perhaps called 
“behavioral health” to make them more palatable, are regularly “carved out” and completely 
separated from regular primary health care services. In fact, because of its emphasis on fast cures 
and cost cutting, managed behavioral care companies also generally stress the use of psychiatric 
medications, a practice seeming more congruent with the “brain disease” conceptualization. So 
while the managed behavioral health industry has been successful in documenting the reduction 
of costs, there has been no concomitant demonstration of improvement in the quality or 
comprehensiveness of care. 
The normalization of “behavioral health” issues might hold promise of reducing the stigmas 
associated with mental illness, making some consumers winners in this conceptualization. 
Though as Torrey (1997) has so passionately argued, consumers with serious mental illness 
could end up “losing” in this conceptualization as they may be lumped in with people with less 
debilitating problems. This could lead to a reduction of specialized services for people with 
serious mental illness, or decreased acknowledgement of the seriousness of major mental illness 
and its impact on the consumer. 
As for the mental health agencies and programs who have changed their names to reflect a 
“behavioral health” model, some would argue that they still appear to have largely retained a 
“brain disease” implementation. For example, about six years ago, one of the authors was 
working for a large health-care company in their “psychiatric services” department when a 
market-wide decision was made to change the name to “behavioral health.” Reasons for the 
switch seemed to reflect a well-intentioned desire to decrease the stigma associated with the 
word “psychiatric” in order to normalize the need for mental health treatment and to move 
toward a more holistic (and contemporary) vision of mental health care. It was acknowledged, 
though, that the facility was still entrenched in a medical model. Indeed, the day after the change, 
the doctors still made rounds, medication was still the primary intervention and psychoeducation 
groups still centered on disease concepts. It seems that changing to the “behavioral health” 
nomenclature may represent more of a wish for the future rather than a reflection of the current 
practice environment. 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK 
PRACTICE 
In order to insure a healthy future for social work, it is essential that social workers be equipped 
with the requisite knowledge and skills for practice in a changing environment. The first set of 
skills that stem from a healthy understanding of “brain disease” and “behavioral health” deals 
with practice and policy. There is a demand that needs to be met for increased information on 
both neurobiological processes and psychotropic medication (Bentley & Walsh, 2001). 
Additionally, social workers who understand the sociopolitical dimensions of “brain disease” and 
“behavioral health” are better able to negotiate and exploit the system for the gains of consumers 
and their families. The evolution of both conceptualizations of mental illness and mental health, 
“brain disease” and “behavioral health,” also requires social workers to be adept at working 
within a multidisciplinary team and consistently not only advocating for, but actually 
demonstrating, the importance and usefulness of a social work role. Increasing 
educationalmaterials in schools of socialwork and in continuing education offerings on 
interdisciplinary teamwork and pursuing related field experiences is encouraged. Both 
conceptualizations call for social workers to continue to move to broader conceptualizations of 
human problems, recognizing the inherent conflict of a knowledge base that, in contrast to the 
professional rhetoric, still may place too much emphasis on psychopathology, or on human 
behavior as a purely psychological phenomenon. Further training and education for social 
workers is needed on the role of stress and coping with disease, pain and loss. This includes a 
real need for cross-cultural research into the epidemiology of disorders and the influence of 
difference on help-seeking and treatment efficacy. 
Other skills that are indicated for social workers in mental health to effectively operate in today’s 
mental health context deal are encompassed under continuing education. Social workers may 
face “professional dissonance” (Taylor, 2002) in their practice when traditional social work 
values collide with real-life mental health treatment interventions that are possibly informed by 
emerging conceptualizations (such as involuntary outpatient commitment). Thus, social workers 
need support and space for dealing with an ethically complex mental health context. There is 
also a growing call in health care for more attention to the interface between illness and 
experience and, thus, a need for more qualitative research into the lived experience of people 
with mental illness. When social workers recognize and respond to the implications or the 
changing lexicon in mental health practice, perhaps then we can more closely approximate what 
Bentley and Taylor (2002, a) define as excellent social work in mental health, that is, practice 
with clients characterized by collaboration, compassion, competence, commitment, and 
creativity. 
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